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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
Case
No. 10754

-v-

ISADORE BLEA,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Isadore Blea, appeals from a conviction on jury trial for the crime of fraudulently obtaining a narcotic drug.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with fraudulently obtaining a narcotic drug by use of a false
name. On August 15, 1966, appellant was found
guilty of said charge and sentenced by the Honorable Leonard W. Elton to a term in the Utah State
Prison of not to exceed five (5) years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of the
tricil court shculd be dfJrrned.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 15, 1965, appellant entered the offices of Dr. Maitland G. Spencer, M. D. and
represented himself to the receptionist as being
Frank Rivera (T. 17). The receptionist ushered appellant into an examing room to await the doctor.
Appellant had previously used the name "Frank
Rivera" in an earlier visit to Dr. Spencer on or about
'November 15, 1965 (T. 32). Appellant again represented himself to Dr. Spencer as being Frank Rivera,
and complained that he and his entire family were
ill and in need of medication for diarrhea (T. 24, 26).
As a result of that conversation, Dr. Spencer gave
appella_nt a prescription for deodorized tincture of
opium (T. 26).
Appellant Blea then took this prescription to
th8 'N estside Drug Store, 880 West 2nd South, Salt
Lake City, Utah and presented it to the pharmacist
on duty for filling. The prescription form bore the
name Frank Rivera and appellant Blea represented
himself to be Frank Rivera to the pharmacist (T. 33).
Pursuant to this prescription the pharmacist filled a
bottle 1.~1ith three o:mr:-es o[ deodorized tincture of
opium 0nd gc1ve lt to apoellnnt. There is no issue that
deodorized tinct1ir8 of opium i::; rt narcotic under
Ut-=ih law.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
- THE TRIAL
TRIER OF FACT
OF THE CRIME
BY THE USE OF

COURT CORRECTLY ADVISED THE
AS TD THE NE CE SS '\HY ELEMENT~
OF OBTAINING A NARCOTIC DRUC
A FALSE NAME.

Appellant in his brief contends that Instruction
No. 8 (R. 9) is incomplete in failing to list two additional items as necessary elements to find a violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-35 (1963). The instruction
as given is set out on page 5 of appellant's brief.
Appellant contends that there must additionally be
shown: (1) an intent to obtain a narcotic drug by use
of the false name or knowledge that the drug so obt.=i.ined was in fact a narcotic, and f2) a reliance by the
doctor or pharmacist prescribing a drug or filling a
prescription on the false name given.
Respondent would answer these contentions by
stating that the trial court gave a complete instruction as to the mental element required to convict in
Instruction No. 9 (R. 10) wherein it said:
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense there must be :J uni.on or joint operation of act
and intent. The intent or intenhon is rnanifested by
the circumst:mces connected with the offense and
the sound mind and discretion of the accuse<1.

The only intent required is that of giving a false
name. There is no question that appellant knowling1y used the name "Frank Rivera" in all his dealings
with the physician and the pharmacist.
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Appellant makes mention of a line of state cases
dealing with unlawful possession of a narcotic. Respondent submits that these cases are in point in this
·matter since appellant knowlingly used a false
name, "Frank Rivera," when he obtained the prescription from Dr. Spencer and obtained the narcotic
itself from the pharmacist. There is no claim that
appellant did not intend to use the false name; no
claim is made that the doctor or the pharmacist misunderstood the name appellant gave to them. Both
recalled the name to be "Frank Rivera;" not too
close in sound to ''Isadore Blea.''
A case cited by appellant is most expletive.
Beasley v. State, 158 Fla. 824, 30 So.2d 379 (1947) was
an action for uttering a forged prescription for narcotic drugs. The court stated at 30 So.2d 380 that in
order to prove the offense, it must be alleged and
shown that: (a) the instrument was forged; (b) that
the defendant knew the instrument was false and
forged and (c) that it was uttered with an intent to
injure or defraud another.
Here this criteria is met. (1) Appellant Blea used
the false name Frank Rivera; (2) Blea knew that this
was a false name; (3) Blea gave the false name with
the intent to defraud both the doctor and the pharmacist
For his second element, appellant urges an
instruction that the jury must find that there was in
fad a reliance on the false name given as an inducement to the procurement of a narcotic drug. To support this contention, he cites the case of State v.

5

Powell, 212 Ore. 684, 321 P.2d 333 (1958). Respondent submits this case can in no way be used to support that principal. In the Powell case, the Oregon
Supreme Court was required to construe two statutes dealing with using false names in obtaining narcotics. One was nearly identical to the Utah statute
here in question. 1 The second made it a misdemeanor to "use a false name or give a false address in
obtaining treatment in the course of which narcotic
drugs are prescribed or dispensed." 2
The court stated that it was required by the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the same acts must be as to all persons
treated either as a felony or as a misdemeanor; not
as both. Therefore, it was unconstitutional to charge
the same act two ways, and since defendant had obtained treatment illegally, the cause was remanded
for sentencing pursuant to the misdemeanor charge.

It is submitted that Powell cannot be authority
for the proposition that reliance by the physician is
a necessary element since the Oregon court was
dealing with constitutional issues as well as attempting to interpret two separate statutes. This distinction
was later pointed out in a case directly supporting
respondent's theory of reliance not being a neces1. Ore. Rev. Stat. 474.170 "(l) No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain
a narcotic drug, or procure the administration of a narcotic drug: "(d)

By the use of a false name or the giving of a false address." And Ore.
Rev. Stat. 474.990 reads as follows: "Any person violating any provision
of this chapter shall: "(l) Upon conviction, be punished _by a fine not
exceeding $5000.00 by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not ex·
ceeding 10 years, or both."

2. Ore. Rev. State. 475.060
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sary element.
State v. Lee, 62 Wash. 2d 228, 382 P.2d 491 (1963)
presented this issue solely. Defendant complained
of severe pain to a physician and requested medication; the physician prescribed a narcotic. It is admitted that in so doing defendant was using a false
name. Defendant then took the prescription to an
adjacent pharmacist, again using the same false
name. He then asked the pharmacist to request the
doctor to prescribe a different drug because the one
prescribed made defendant ill. Another narcotic was
substituted and the prescription filled.

The Washington State Supreme Court made a.
thorough review of its state's codification of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and cited other jurisdictions'
approaches to the question of actual reliance as an
element of fraudulently obtaining a narcotic drug by
the use of a false name. Respondent would direct
this court's attention to the three cases discussed
therein: People v. Oviedo, 106 C.A.2d 690, 235 P.2d
612 (1951); State v. Newstead,
Mo. _______ , 280
S.W.2d 6 (1955); and Geurin v. Nevada, 73 Nev. L'.33,
315 P.2d 965 0957).
The Court in discussing the bask purpose of
enacting a statute identical to that of Utah, said at
382 P.2d 494:
The legislative purpose, in enacting the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act, was to curh illrgnl traffic in narcotic drugs, and to regulate and control their sale
and distribution. The section here in question. when
read in conjunction with the recording provisions of
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the act, is directed at a particular aspect of this gencrn 1 purpose, nmnely, to prevent a person with a
seemin,~ly legitimate complaint from obtaining an
oversupply of narcotic drugs by using a different
1w.r:1e and address in any number of physicians' offices and/or pharmacies. To curtail such excessive
use and the unlav:ful obtaining of narcotic drugs is
well \Vithin the proper exercise of the police power
of the state.

The court concluded that in enacting such a provision:
The legislature did not intend that proof of reliance
upon a false na~w and I or address by the doctor or
pharmacist should be an element of the offense.

POINT 2
T'HERE \VAS AMPLE DIHECT TESTIMONY THAT
"ISADORE BLEA" WAS IN FACT THE DEFENDANT'S
NAME.

In his second assignment of error, appellant attempts to convince this court that the trier of fact had
no testimony or informaion that "Blea" was in fact
this defendant's name. Respondent would say only
that defendant was addressed as Blea by the trial
judge, by both counsel, and by all witnesses who
identified him. To be more specific, the state's
chief narcotic investigator identified defendant as
Isadore Blea and stated that he had known Blea previously:

Q.

Now, are you acquainted with an individual known as Isadore Blea?

A.

Yes, sir.

O.

Do you see him in the Courtroom?
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A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Would you point him out, please?
A.

Mr. Blea is sitting over there.

Q.

You had a conversation with Mr. Blea?

A. Yes.
Q.

On more than one occassion?

A.

Yes.

(T. 45).

Counsel for the defendant referred to his client
as Blea IT. 48). Both Dr. Spencer and the pharmacist
identified the defendant as Blea (T. 24, 34). The respondent submits that the trier of fact had more than
sufficient direct testimony to identify the defendant
as Isadore Blea.
POINT 3
THERE WAS NO ERROR AT TRIAL COURT TO
REQUIRE REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL.

For his third point on appeal, appellant cites
numerous cases to the effect that instrucions not objected to at trial cannot be reviewed on appeal unless there was such an extreme misstatement of law
as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Again respondent takes no issue with this statement of law.
However, appellant has completely failed to show
any instance wherein the instructions given in this
case were in fact erroneous.
Instruction No. 8 (R. 9) gives the elements of the
::Mense charged:
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1. That on or about the 15th day of December,
1965, that said defendant obtained a narcotic
drug known as Deodorized Tincture of Opium;

2. That Deodorized Tintcnre of Opium is a narcotic
drug within the meaning of the laws of the State
of Utah;
3. That said defendant obtained said narcotic drug
by the use of a false name;
4. That the acts took place within the confines of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Appellant has attempted to show a further requirement of actual reliance by the doctor on the
false name given as a basis for issuing the prescription or that were it not for the false name, the doctor ·
would not have issued it. Respondent has shown
this requirement to be falacious. The law requires
the state to show only that which it did: 1. That the
defendant obtained a narcotic drug. 2. That the defendant obtained said narcotic drug by the use of a
false name. 3. That the act occurred in the state of
Utah. The necessary intent required on the part of
the defendant was shown by his voluntary use of
the false name Frank Rivera. Instruction No. 9 gives
the statutory requirement of intent taken from Utah
Code Ann.§ 76-1-20 (1953).
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the trial court correctly
instructed the trier of fact as to the requirements for
a conviction for the crime of illegally obtaining a

10
narcotic drug by use of a false name. Appellant has
wholly failed to show any error committed at trial
and herefore this court must affirm the conviction of
the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

LEROY S. AXLAND
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

